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1. Introduction
The aim of the present paper is to introduce the theoretical conceptualization 
of perceptual communication through expressive qualities. The study of 
expressive qualities has a long tradition of theoretical research in Experimental 
Phenomenology (Stumpf, 1907; Wertheimer, 1923; Katz, 1935; Metzger, 1941; 
Michotte, 1946; Kanizsa, 1979; Thinès, Costall, & Butterworth, 1981; Bozzi, 
1989; 1999; Savardi and Bianchi, 1997; Masin, 2002; Sinico, 2003; 2008; 
Verstegen, 2005; Zavagno, Antonelli, & Actis Grosso, 2008; Toccafondi, 2012; 
Albertazzi, 2013, Calì, 2017), with a huge amount of experimental research. 
According to Experimental Phenomenology, expressive qualities (e.g., “the willow 
is weeping”, “the sea is agitated”, and “the front of the car is aggressive”) are 
not simple subjective projections. This concept – whereby inanimate objects are 
perceived to have emotions or moralities as humans do – is a subclass of tertiary 
qualities. According to Bozzi (1985):
If black is gloomy, red is lively. The shadow of a great green tree is soothing 
and relaxing. A diminished-seventh chord is sharp and anxious. A slow and 
rising gesture is hieratic. Here we aren’t limiting ourselves to arbitrarily be-
stowing stereotyped adjectives to mere facts; in those facts there are truly char-
acteristics that magnetically attract those adjectives, and those characteristics 
are not of a verbal or associative nature, but perceptual ingredients present 
within the facts themselves. (English translation in Bozzi, 2019, p. 356)
Differently from the traditional distinction between qualities of experience intro-
duced by John Locke, Experimental Phenomenology – and in particular, Gestalt 
Psychology – defines tertiary qualities as the immediate qualities of experience 
before any kind of categorization (Sinico, 2012). In contrast to the primary and 
secondary qualities, tertiary qualities do not fall within the category of the men-
surative schema. Tertiary qualities are typically exemplified by melody, which, 
when transposed in key so that each of the tones has a different frequency, does 
not change. However, tertiary qualities do not express anything. In fact, a simple 
sequence of three tones (C, E flat, and G) has both an expressive character of 
sadness and a tertiary character of unitary succession as its specific phenomenal 
quality (Sinico, 2015).
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Insofar as qualities phenomenally perceived and intersubjectively verifiable, they 
are objective. When Wolfgang Köhler writes that “Few people can hear the rum-
bling crescendo of distant thunder as a neutral sensory fact; it sounds to most 
of us ‘menacing’ (1947 [1929], p. 244)”, he maintains that people hear this in-
tersubjective expressive quality, a menace, belonging to objects of the external 
phenomenal world. In this theoretical perspective, expressive qualities are a parte 
objecti: “I do not see any reason why such ‘tertiary qualities’ should not occur on 
the objective side of the phenomenal field” (Köhler, 1938, p. 78).
The present paper deals with how an object communicates meaning through 
 expressivity without signs. For this reason, initially, the difference between 
semiotic and perceptual modes of communication is discussed. After defining 
expression, I present some experimental phenomenological studies as examples 
of perceptual communication through expressive qualities. Lastly, expressive 
plurivocity is discussed.
2.  Perceptual Communication Mediated by Sign and Based on  
Expressive Qualities
Perceptual communication has principally two different modalities. The first 
one is mediated by signs, and the second one is based on expressive qualities. 
This distinction reflects two different conceptions in perception: the theory of 
indirect perception, supported in particular today by cognitive scientists, as 
opposed to the second conception, the theory of immediate perception, 
supported by Gestaltists, Michottians, and also ecological psychologists 
(see Schwartz, 2004).
In fact, perceptual communication mediated by signs implies mental representa-
tion. This is the classic assumption of Cognitive Science, which is coherent with 
the theoretical basis of Semiotics (Eco, 1968). For example, on a street sign, the 
icon of a deer, is needed to communicate to the driver the danger that a deer may 
cross the road. The icon of the deer is connected to its reference, which is the rep-
resentation of the deer in the mind of the driver. By activating this representation, 
the driver understands the risk that a deer, in flesh and bone, may suddenly appear 
in front of him. Using a rhetorical figure, he understands the risk of  colliding 
against the reference. This modality of communication is largely accepted and 
 assimilated in the semiotics culture. Each time that a community shares the mean-
ing of a sign (a symbol, an index, or an icon), the question of the relationship 
between sign and reference is an important cognitive question. In this sense, the 
semiotic thinking is very precious, and it is well represented in literature.
Conversely, the second modality of perceptual communication, based on 
expressive qualities, does not have an acceptable bibliography. There are some 
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historical reasons for this, which I identify principally in the assumption of 
physicalism in Cognitive Science (Sinico, 2015). In any case, the generic and 
passive acceptation of the semiotic theoretical premise has been an obstacle to 
the formulation of the right definition of the perceptual communication based 
on expressive qualities.
The most important theoretical reference for expressive qualities is Experimental 
Phenomenology (Bozzi, 1999), which has its epistemological anchorage in Ge-
stalt Psychology and in the theory of immediate perception by Albert Michotte 
(Thinès, Costall, & Butterworth, 1981). According to this theory, the qualities 
of the objects are immediately and directly perceived, without any mediation of 
mental activity (without any unconscious inferences, without past experiences, 
without internal cognitive symbols, and so on). As a consequence, in this theo-
retical perspective of immediate and direct perception, in Experimental Phenom-
enology, the assumption of a stage of representation of the cognitive system is 
excluded (Bozzi, 1985), to the point that I can state here a reference fallacy, similar 
to Eco (1975), who claims that “referential fallacy” is the false assumption that 
the meaning of a sign is determined by its referent (i.e., by the reality to which 
the sign refers). In fact, Eco (1976) postulates the mediation of a concept, of a 
representation (i.e., the reference).
Qualitative aspects, observed immediately and directly in the perceptual 
 experience – the shape of a weeping willow, the magnitude of a cathedral, and 
the booming rumble of thunder are never perceptually neutral: they appear 
 respectively sad, majestic, and threatening – can be also called “meanings”; 
but, as Guillaume (1937) suggests, to use the term “intrinsic sense” is more 
appropriate theoretically because this locution does not recall the notion 
of sign.
As an example, we can consider the quality of color as a bearer of manifold 
 expressive characters. A clear and saturated orange expresses happiness. When a 
person wears clothing with that color, by the specific expressive quality of that 
color (i.e., to be happy), he/she communicates happiness, irrespective of his/her 
emotion. Briefly, if X intends to communicate to Y his/her happiness, the follow-
ing may occur:
a) In the modality mediated by sign, X produces the words “I am happy”, and 
Y hears the words. Since the words are connected with the mental represen-
tation of happiness, Y infers the message by X.
b) In the modality based on expressive qualities, X has an orange dress and inter-
acts with Y. Y sees that X expresses, by the empirical data (i.e., the  happiness 
of the orange, the expressive quality of the color), the message of “happiness” 
of X.
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c) This schematic distinction implies a very different set of assumptions. These 
differences separate two irreconcilable epistemological universes. The first re-
markable difference is the assumption of the role of culture. In the semiotics 
view, culture and communication are interdependent: by culture, the process 
of signification is actuated; at the same time, the system of signs expresses 
the products of a culture. In this perspective, a symbol is always a result of 
a cultural agreement. For example, in front of a traffic light, drivers stop 
(except in the case of road infringement) because there is a social agreement 
that establishes the following: if the traffic light is red, the driver must stop 
his car. As a consequence, the perceptual communication mediated by sign is 
impossible without a shared code.
Conversely, an expressive fact, such as a color, has an intrinsic sense, also out-
side any preventive cultural agreement between the actors of communication. 
The expressive quality taken by a color – the happiness of orange, to use the 
same example – is not the result of a shared code, neither the result of an 
opinion, but it is an objective fact. Here, “objective” means what satisfies the 
criteria of the experimental verification: intersubjectivity, repeatability, and 
predictability. Regarding this, there is ample literature on the study of expres-
sive events and a large number of experimental research that has investigated 
perception in children and animals. For example, Schlottmann, Surian, and 
Ray showed that infants from 6 months are sensitive to the causal structure of 
launch. From 3 years, children distinguish social causality in reaction events 
from physical causality in launch events (Schlottmann, Ray, & Surian, 2002; 
Schlottmann & Surian, 1999; Schlottmann, Surian, & Ray, 2009). Further-
more, Mascalzoni, Regolin, and Vallortigara (2010) found that newly hatched 
chicks  prefer self-propelled objects than objects exhibiting motion caused by 
physical  contact. This preference cannot be explained in terms of any specif-
ic learning. This study suggests that perception of animacy is not necessarily 
influenced by subjectivity or by culture.
Second, the fact that a certain perceptual property, such as a color, corresponds 
to an expressive quality does not exclude the possibility that a color can be a sign 
determined by a cultural agreement. To the point that the cultural agreement can 
even be in contrast with the objective expressivity of the perceptual property. For 
example, drivers’ reactions in front of the traffic light colors is reasonably conven-
tional. But, we can easily imagine a different cultural convention with opposite 
values: red means “go”, and green means “stop”. This convention would not be 
the counterevidence that red color expresses vivacity and alertness and green color 
expresses calm and relaxation. On the other hand, it is also possible to suppose an 
influence of the perceptual aspects of the experience on the genesis of the signifi-
cance, as Rudolf Arnheim claimed:
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Geometrically simple shapes emerge everywhere at an advanced stage of 
mental development because they are accessible to the limited organizing 
powers of a simple mind. They are retained in advanced civilisation for 
the purpose of schematic, symbolic or so-called ornamental representation  
because they provide the most clear-cut images of the most basic config-
uration of forces that continue to underlie man’s life, and therefore man’s 
thinking, even in refinement and complexity. (Arnheim, 1960, p. 243)
Another important clarification concerns the role of learned knowledge. To 
maintain that perceptual qualities, and in particular, expressive qualities, are ob-
jective does not imply that all perception is intercultural or that it is universal. It 
is theoretically very important to distinguish the different levels in which culture, 
cognitive integration, subjectivity, and past experience can influence the meaning 
of our everyday objects. In a picture of the fourteenth century, the figures corre-
spond to an accurate and complex symbology. A person who does not know the 
meaning of that symbology “sees” a different art work than someone who knows 
these meanings. This obvious fact does not prevent the naïve and expert observers 
from seeing such objective properties as shapes, sizes, colors, and also expressive 
values. Easily, the expert observer integrates the intersubjective perceptions with 
his knowledge.
Likewise, past experience, i.e. subjective experience, contributes to seeing the per-
ceptual world with added meaning. As a consequence, past experience implies 
relevant intersubjective differences: personal memories add private values that 
other people cannot see because they are just that private. But also this obvious 
evidence does not imply that all perceptual qualities change in different individ-
uals. The memory is an integration that does not transform objects (Pylyshyn, 
1999; Firestone and Scholl, 2016), but it adds meaning to the intersubjective 
perceptual datum.
To get back to the perceptual communication based on expressive qualities, the 
choice of a determined perceptual property, e.g., in a design project, can be a de-
liberate communicative goal. The expressive quality expresses a specific character 
of the design object and the designer communicates, by perceptual properties, the 
presence of that character. It is necessary to underline that the term “presence” 
here has an important theoretical value, because in perceptual communication 
based on expressive qualities, the properties are just “in presence”, i.e., under ob-
servation, hic et nunc. In fact, the properties do not refer to something else. That 
is exactly what Hanslick said about music:
(…) while sound in speech is but a sign, that is, a means for the pur-
pose of expressing something which is quite distinct from its medium; 
sound in music is the end, that is, the ultimate and absolute object in view. 
(Hanslick, 1854, p. 94)
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And more recently:
Most people would say, I think, that, when they hear, for instance, sadness 
in a musical theme or passage, they do not hear it the way they see the dog 
in a dog-picture but, rather, the way they see the redness in an apple: not, 
in other words, as a representational but as a simple perceptual quality. 
(Kivy, 2002, p. 30)
3. To Externalize Something That Is Internal
From an etymological point of view, “to express” comes from the Latin “exprim-
ere”. The Latin word is composed of the prefix “ex”, which means “out”, and 
the second part that means “to press”. In this meaning, the word “to express” 
can be defined as to externalize something that is internal, to make something 
extrinsic that which is intrinsic. In this definition, a difference between internal 
and  external is implied. This distinction is common knowledge. For example, a 
private thought is inscrutable and closed into the inner personal mind. It is less 
evident how objects, or the qualities, can have an internal dimension from which 
to externalize something. This difficulty has historically fueled an unfounded the-
oretical prejudice. In fact, the prejudice is based on a mistake: to speak about an 
interior dimension of objects induces, ontologically, attributes that resemble a 
soul in the object. Experimental research has no title to consider the metaphysical 
idea of a soul in objects. On the contrary, it is not a metaphysical assumption to 
maintain that every object expresses the character of its own structural essence. 
The definition of expression, in relationship to objects, avoids the theoretical 
prejudice concerning the extrinsic–intrinsic dichotomy: objects, by their own 
empirical presence, externalize their own specific character. In this meaning, the 
active form “to externalize” or “to express” implies the presence of a system in 
which there is also an observer.
I would like to point out that the specific character of an object, which a single 
object externalized, is not an expressive quality only for one object. For example, 
because of a determinate shape, a weeping willow expresses sadness; but the same 
expressive quality, the sadness, can also be expressed by the posture of a human 
being (depressed) or by a minor chord. In other words, expressive qualities are 
not specific for one specific object or for one specific object property. On the 
other hand, expressive qualities do not exist without objects or object properties: 
sadness needs specific shapes, specific chords, specific colors, specific movements, 
specific flavors, and so on.
It is now possible to look for the concrete modality of communication by 
 expressive qualities. Expressive qualities cannot express by themselves a character; 
they require something with which to make an expression: an “expressing”. The 
expressing can be a single quality (shape, size, weight, color, timbre, flavor, etc.), 
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an object globally considered (a Gestalt) or relationships between objects (includ-
ing relationships between objects and their contexts).
Regarding single qualities, a particular color, for instance, may express by itself 
an intersensorial character. The opposition of warm versus cool colors is well ac-
cepted (see Arnheim, 1974). In any case, the expressivity of one color is some-
times only an abstraction, because every perceptual variable of objects is normally 
influenced by other perceptual variables or by the whole. For this reason, the 
expressive value of a single quality is usually a result of a dynamic interrelation of 
phenomenal variables. Therefore, considering the global object, a good example 
is the human walk. Kurt Koffka had already observed as follows:
The slow dragging movements of the depressed, the jerky, discontinu-
ous movements of the irritable, correspond indeed to the leaden state of 
 depression or the distrupted state of irritability. The one, viz. the overt side, 
is as much depression or irritability as the other, the conscious side. There-
fore it is meaningful to say that real behaviour, (…), emotional. (Koffka, 
1935, p. 658)
The human walk is, therefore, an insightful example to clarify that an invari-
ant may be a medium to express a specific character of an object. In the 1970s, 
Gunnar Johansson studied biological motion (Johansson, 1973; Jansson, Berg-
ström, & Epstein, 1994). He demonstrated that only a few light dots (about 12) 
– carefully positioned on the body – are sufficient to recognize the human walk 
in the dark. The global pattern was a perceptual invariant. Other investigations 
demonstrated that, by specific invariants, observers easily recognize the walk of 
a male or a female, the walk of an old or a young person, and whether they are 
happy or sad, nervous or relaxed, light or heavy, etc. (Dittrich, Troscianko, Lea, 
& Morgan, 1996; Clarke, Bradshaw, Field, Hampson, & Rose, 2005). In other 
words, the observers do not project a subjective expressive value to the objects; 
however, they immediately recognize the expressive qualities that are reducible 
to invariants by a few dots that, over time, maintain a coherent structure. Here, 
there is the possibility to isolate, by this invariant structure, expressive qualities. 
The invariant structure is also a very useful theoretical instrument because, by 
vector analysis, it is possible to run models mathematically for the transposition 
of expressive values.
Expressive qualities can be expressed also by relationships between objects. 
Observers recognize happiness or sadness in biological motion by the percep-
tion of expressive invariants, the same as in the experiments of Michotte (1946) 
and Heider and Simmel (1944) for the recognition of dominance or complian-
cy in interpersonal relations. These classical studies are good examples of how 
human observers directly perceive specific interpersonal relationships by the 
motion of simple perceptual patterns. In fact, they demonstrated that simple 
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geometrical figures (such as squares or rectangles) – when in motion – establish 
determinate anthropomorphical interpersonal relations (without any physical 
meaning,  because, in the experiments, geometrical figures had obviously inde-
pendent movements) only if they respected determined perceptual conditions. It 
is important to emphasize that expressive events do not rest upon the variables 
considered as entities measurable with physical instruments. Expressive qualities 
“rest upon this level of reality, which is the reality directly shown by observable 
things, measurement aside” (Bozzi, 2019, p. 364). A paradigmatic example is the 
launching effect (Michotte, 1946): if a red square moves immediately after per-
ceived contact is made by a preceding black square, the motion of the red square 
is reported by the observers to have been caused by the black. The first perceptual 
condition is the value of the time interval between the moments of contact of the 
squares. The second condition is the ratio of the velocities of the red square to 
the black square. The third is the length of the path of the red square. The same 
outcome is achieved in the acoustic field. For example, Anolli and Ciceri (1997) 
investigate the production of emotional expressions (encoding) and their recog-
nition (decoding). They show how patterns of acoustic variables (in particular, 
tempo – i.e., the temporal regulation of the production and articulation of the 
phrase – frequency, and amplitude) can contribute to the process of determining 
the recognition of emotions. These findings constitute a very important theoret-
ical goal because, by perceptual laws, it is possible to define the structures of the 
expressive events.
4. Plurivocity
As already mentioned, expressive qualities are transobjective: the same expressive 
quality may be equally expressed by different properties (such as shape, motion, 
weight, color, taste, tone, and so on), objects, or relationships between objects. 
Menace is perceived equally by the crescendo of thunder, the sound of a chord, 
a facial expression, or a particular light. On the contrary, the same objects can 
share many expressive characters. In this case, objects are expressively “plurivocal” 
(I prefer to use the term ‘plurivocal’ instead of ‘polysemic’ to avoid the semiot-
ic lexicon). Plurivocity has been studied extensively in ambiguous or bistable 
figures. Conversely, there is no literature regarding expressive plurivocity. It is 
common experience that the same musical chord, for instance, may express 
together sadness, bitterness, and also solemnity; the table top may express togeth-
er hardness, solidity, and also levelness. These different and compresent expres-
sive qualities have different perceptual saliences. Several conditions determine the 
perceptual salience: the observer, the object, and the context.
First, the observer can intentionally fix the focus on a particular expressive quality 
over the others. The observer’s disposition is widely oriented by the object and, 
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in any case, the observer cannot force the expressive value. A depressed mood 
cannot see sadness in the lively color or in the happy sound of the trumpet of 
the Carnival. Even in these cases, these expressive values generate an egodystonic 
subjective response.
Concerning objects, different and compresent expressive qualities can appear 
more or less salient. This is the value of plurivocity. With a low value of plurivoc-
ity, a single expressive character prevails over the others and focuses on itself all 
the global expressivity (e.g., chord structure, temporal organization, and sound 
amplitude may together express sadness). In general, with low plurivocity, objects 
show a single and clear expressive identity and they are perceptively more intelli-
gible. When objects have a high value of plurivocity, multiple expressive charac-
ters may be equivalent, and it is impossible to separate one prevalent expressive 
character (e.g., chord structure may express sadness, temporal organization may 
express agitation, and sound amplitude may express solemnity, all in the same 
musical passage). Objects with high plurivocity, in general, have the advantage of 
avoiding aesthetic glut.
Plurivocal objects can also include cases of contrasting expressive characters 
that generate perceptual incoherence. A good example of this is given by the 
face makeup of clowns, in which – typically – the eyes are sad and the mouth 
is smiling (see Figure 1). In this case, the contrast of two opposite and robust 
expressive characters prevents the normal perception of the expressive unity of 
the face.
Finally, the context also can determine the predominance of one among the mul-
tiple expressive characters in the plurivocal object. The perceptual effects that 
govern the relationship between the plurivocal object and the context can be the 
contrast but also assimilation. Assimilation determines an effect of objective ob-
servation called “objective setting” (see Metzger, 1941). In Figure 2, for instance, 
the eyes appear happy on the left and sad on the right, even though, physically 
speaking, the areas of the eyes are identical. In this case, the different expres-
sions of the mouth influence, by assimilation, the perception of the eyes (Bayer, 
Schwartz, & Pelli, 1998).
All these objective determinations do not exclude subjective differences regarding 
sensitivity in perception of expressive qualities. Different subjects can perceive 
different values of expressivity. The differences do not demonstrate the relativity 
of the actual world, as claimed by radical subjectivists, but only the necessity of 
a critical approach to evaluate the real features of the world. In fact, different 
subjects also, with different perceptual dispositions, perceive the same expressive 
qualities if they are put in the same observational conditions and if they have the 
same perceptual goal.
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 5/15/19 9:10 AM
GESTALT THEORY, Vol. 41, No.1
56 Original Contributions - Originalbeiträge
Fig. 1 An example of contrasting expressive characters. The eyes are sad, and the mouth is smiling.
Fig. 2 The expression of the eyes (identical in both the images) changes as an effect of assimilation 
with the expression of the mouth (from Bayer, Schwartz, and Pelli, 1998).
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5. Conclusion
In conclusion, the theory of expressive quality represents an important tool for 
perceptual communication. It aims to provide a useful framework, for instance, 
in design sciences, where the user experience is often dominated by emotional 
qualities (Norman, 2004). Unlike semiotics, through expressive qualities, com-
munication concerns the properties of the objects that are immediately perceived 
(and, therefore, without any subjective reference to other indirect knowledge), 
universal (and consequently without any difference between any other subjects 
and cultures), and then intersubjective.
As a complement to the qualitative studies, by the tradition of Experimental 
Phenomenology, recent studies within Ecological Psychology and the paradigms 
on biological motion present the possibility of extracting structural invariances of 
the expressive phenomena. From these results, quantitative models for the trans-
position of expressive values can be obtained.
Summary
The present paper introduces the theoretical conceptualization of perceptual communica-
tion through expressive qualities. Initially, the difference with respect to the modality of 
perceptual communication mediated by signs is analyzed. Conversely, the theory of expres-
sive qualities reflects the psychological conception of direct perception: any assumption of 
a cognitive stage of representation is excluded. Perceptual communication immediately 
expresses the specific character of the structural essence of the object. The structural essence 
is well studied by the perceptual paradigms of Experimental Phenomenology. Plurivocity, 
the case in which the same objects can share many expressive characters, is also considered.




Der vorliegende Beitrag stellt das theoretische Konzept zu wahrnehmungsbasiert-
er Kommunikation durch expressive Qualitäten vor. Zunächst wird der Unterschied 
zum Modus der durch Zeichen vermittelten wahrnehmungsbasierten Kommunikation 
analysiert. Umgekehrt spiegelt die Theorie der Ausrducksquailtäten das psychologische 
Konzept direkter Wahrnehmung: jede Annahme von Stadien kognitiver Verarbeitung 
wird ausgeschlossen. Wahrnehmungsbasierte Kommunikation drückt unmittelbar den 
spezifischen Charakter des strukturellen Wesens des Objekts aus. Dieses strukturelle 
Wesen ist durch die Wahrnehmungsmuster der experimentellen Phänomenologie gut 
erforscht. Plurivität, also der Fall, in dem dieselben Objekte viele ausdrucksstarke 
Zeichen miteinander teilen können, wird ebenfalls berücksichtigt.
Schlüsselwörter: Ausdrucksqualitäten, wahrnehmungsgeleitete Kommunikation, 
Plurivität, experimentelle Phänomenologie, Gestaltpsychologie.
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